THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE: CAN IT COMPETE IN THE NEXT CENTURY?

Expert Advice on Maintaining U.S. Technological Edge
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT NSI AND DUCO</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT THE EXPERTS</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEY FINDING 1: THE DOUBLE THREATPOSED BY CHINA</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEY FINDING 2: THE U.S. MILITARY ADVANTAGE IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM KEY ADVERSARIES</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEY FINDING 3: THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE IS VULNERABLE</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEY FINDING 4: MAINTAINING THE U.S. MILITARY’S ADVANTAGE</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE EXPERTS</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURVEY QUESTIONS</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGGREGATED DATA</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

This report is the culmination of a collaboration between the National Security Institute (NSI) and Duco, where more than 100 top national security experts at NSI and Duco shared their insights on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as well as the broader state of United States national security and its geopolitical standing. NSI and Duco experts were asked to contribute to this project via a survey. This report summarizes the findings, trends, and key takeaways that emerged from the expert responses. Specifically, this report breaks down the trends in four sections: I) the double threat posed by China, II) the U.S. military advantage is under pressure from adversaries, III) the U.S. defense industrial base is vulnerable, and IV) the U.S. must maintain its military advantage.

Key Takeaways

1. There is a greater threat perception of China vis-a-vis other adversaries, with a majority of survey respondents consistently supportive of defending against China even though doing so may have economic consequences.

   China is viewed as a strategic competitor, and a plurality of survey respondents were accepting of placing constraints on China, even if there were economic costs to U.S. firms.

2. There is near consensus that the United States’s military advantage is shrinking relative to key adversaries and one of the means of addressing this trend is by making it easier to procure domestic commercial technologies.

   By and large, respondents were supportive of the government investing more in the defense industrial base, making it easier for the Defense Department to procure commercial technologies, and limiting the dependence on foreign suppliers.

3. There is broad acceptance that the U.S. defense industrial base is vulnerable and that the federal government bureaucracy makes it harder for commercial firms to do business in the federal market.

   While experts differed on the approach, a majority favored “Buy American” regulations, reforming the acquisition process to make it easier for non-traditional suppliers, cutting regulations, and having the government pay more to increase competition.

4. There is broad consensus that the Department of Defense (DoD) budget, requirements, and contracting processes are unnecessarily burdensome and too bureaucratic.

   Experts believe that it is in the long-term interest of DoD to engage in policy changes that make the process less bureaucratic in order to increase competition and foster a strong defense manufacturing base.
Introduction

In early Fall 2020, the National Security Institute (NSI), a leading think tank and academic center housed at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School, partnered with Duco, one of the nation’s premier geopolitical expert consulting organizations, to provide key national security insights to the policymaking community. Members of the NSI and Duco communities contributed to a joint survey that asked over 100 top national security experts to analyze critical national security and geopolitical issues and provide their analysis of key provisions of the House- and Senate-passed versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (NDAA), which were passed by their respective bodies in July 2020. If a combined version is agreed upon, as is likely in late 2020, such a bill would typically be approved by both chambers and sent to the White House for signature.

The NDAA provides general policy guidance to DoD across a range of areas, authorizes funding levels for the new fiscal year, and provides specific direction for how congressionally-allocated funds should be spent. Among other areas, the FY 21 NDAA, as passed by both the House and the Senate in different forms at the time of the survey, emphasizes how DoD can work with the commercial sector to protect supply chains and access dual-use technologies and innovation, which is a critical issue as the nation faces the longer-term threat from China.

The survey was composed of more than 50 subject matter questions and collected over 4,500 data points from the 100+ expert participants from July 31, 2020 to October 6, 2020. A team of policy analysts studied the survey results; this report features the key insights, recommendations, and analysis from the survey, including specific, focused analysis from key NSI and Duco experts, as well as the underlying survey questions and data itself and information on the survey respondents.
About NSI

The National Security Institute is a leading national security and foreign policy think tank and academic center housed within George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School. NSI is dedicated to finding real-world answers to some of the hardest national security law and policy questions facing policymakers. NSI is a platform for research, teaching, scholarship, and policy development that incorporates a realistic assessment of the threats facing the United States and its allies, as well as an appreciation of the legal and practical challenges facing U.S. intelligence, defense, law enforcement, homeland security, and cybersecurity communities. NSI also strives to educate future leaders and to shape the debate on critical issues by providing much needed balance to the public discourse by identifying solutions that both enable a strong national defense as well as safeguard American constitutional liberties.

NSI’s diverse group of faculty members and experts bring dozens of decades of combined experience tackling national security challenges at the most senior levels of all three branches of the U.S. government as well as in key private sector institutions to their work at NSI. NSI’s experts, including those that participated in this survey, include key U.S. military, defense, and intelligence officials and senior officers, as well as technology experts, business executives and startup funders, and venture capitalists from Washington, D.C. to Silicon Valley. NSI’s experts are positioned to rapidly respond to the developing national security threat landscape and the immediate need of policymakers.

In the short three years since its founding, NSI’s experts have appeared in over 5,500 print, television, radio, and other media appearances and have testified over 30 times before the United States Congress. Over the same time period, NSI experts have authored dozens of books, academic articles, op-eds, and analytic pieces, including nearly two dozen pieces published directly by NSI for consumption by senior policymakers in the legislative and executive branches. NSI continues to lead on critical national security issues and will remain at the forefront of these matters in the years ahead.
About Duco

Duco is reinventing the way organizations access and hire experts to help solve complex global challenges. With a global roster of hundreds of world-class experts and partner organizations in over 55 countries, Duco builds and manages project-specific teams to deliver innovative solutions.

Duco’s clients have direct access to hundreds of vetted experts around the globe who serve as an extension of their team. Duco’s roster includes former high-ranking government officials; international academia, technology, and security experts; and other industry executives. Duco’s website platform features expert search, direct messaging, advanced surveying capabilities, rapid thought-leader advocacy mechanisms, and robust project management tools to quickly aggregate insights and produce comprehensive analytical reports and products that can support a strategic messaging campaign.

Duco’s primary client base—including Fortune 500 companies—spans technology companies and nonprofits, as well as prominent consulting firms who use Duco as a secret weapon to service their corporate clients. Duco has deep experience as both a surveyor and a convener—from tech-focused roundtables, to discussions on China, to insider threats at American tech companies.

Duco is a women-owned small business headquartered in San Francisco, California. Duco’s leadership and investors sit at the intersection of the technology industry in Silicon Valley, international business, and foreign policy.
About the Experts

NSI and Duco’s experts have decades of combined experience in national security, defense, and intelligence across the U.S. government, including four-star military generals, Senate-confirmed directors of intelligence agencies, diplomats, political appointees across various presidential administrations, and business leaders and entrepreneurs.

The 111 survey respondents self-reported to have expertise and experience in:

85% National Security

67% Foreign Policy/Geopolitics

55% Intelligence

48% Cybersecurity

44% Emerging Technology
Compared to other nation-state adversaries, only China was viewed by a significant majority of experts as being both a national security and economic threat.

There was near unanimity that China is and will continue to be the major national security and economic competitor for the United States in years to come.

While Russia was also viewed as a national security competitor by 99.1% of respondents, only 12.6% saw it as a substantive economic competitor. In contrast, 96.4% of NSI and Duco experts saw China as a national security competitor and 88.3% saw China as an economic competitor. Likewise, while Iran (87.4%) and North Korea (90.1%) were both viewed as national security competitors to the United States, only a handful of respondents thought either compete with the U.S. economically.

There was near unanimity that China is unlikely to be an economic or national security ally of the U.S.

While only 7.2% of respondents believed that China might be an economic ally to the United States, fewer than 1% of respondents thought it might be a national security ally. Fewer than 1% of respondents also took the same view on both fronts with respect to Russia. This is particularly important considering that there was near unanimity (94.6%) that China would remain or become a major global player within the next decade, while only 60.4% of respondents thought Russia would fit in this category. A separate contingent of respondents (36.9%) believed Russia is only a regional actor. Interestingly, significant majorities believe that both Iran (81.1%) and North Korea (86.5%) are regional actors and are likely to remain so over the next decade notwithstanding the fact that Iran may be actively pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities and that North Korea currently possess both. Only small numbers of NSI and Duco experts surveyed believe that either Iran (14.4%) or North Korea (9.9%) are or might become global players in the near term.
There was near unanimity among NSI and Duco experts - 97.3% - that the United States should not allow China to acquire defense-sensitive U.S. technology and data. Indeed, when the question focused on the Senate-passed bill's provision seeking to restrict China's acquisition of American defense-sensitive technology, there were very strong views among respondents. Specifically, 88.3% of respondents strongly supported the provision protecting U.S. defense-sensitive technology and data from being acquired by China and there was no opposition whatsoever (0%) to such a provision.

Likewise, there was also near unanimity amongst respondents - 97.3% - that the U.S. should not contract with firms that use certain Chinese telecommunications equipment or services at significant scale. 85.6% of NSI and Duco experts felt it was very important for the U.S. government not to do business with contractors that use Chinese telecommunications equipment at significant scale. A very small number of respondents (<2%) thought restrictions on U.S. government contractors using Chinese telecommunications equipment at significant scale was not important.
While a plurality of respondents (46.6%) supported extending the time for compliance a year or less, significant minorities were also on opposite sides of an extension, with 26.1% believing the restriction ought to be enforced now and 16.2% taking the view that the compliance timeframe ought to be extended beyond a year.

At the same time, there was significant support among NSI and Duco experts - 63.1% - to extend the amount of time U.S. government contractors have to meet the requirements needed to comply with the Chinese telecommunications restrictions.

"At present and for the foreseeable future, China poses the single biggest threat to the U.S. and its allies. China’s ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will continue to use every possible instrument of national power at its disposal - economic, financial, military, technology, and intelligence - to undermine the U.S. at home and abroad and it is critical that the United States recognize the great power competition for what it is: a threat to America’s long term security."

David Shedd
Fmr. Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Over 68% supported the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification. Though it did not gain the same support as Chinese telecommunications restrictions, the CMMC was deemed very important by 41.1% of respondents. Only 4.5% thought it was not important at all.

A number of experts expressed concerns that efforts to protect against cyber and telecommunication intrusion from China will lead to economic consequences against American companies, which may further dissuade such companies from working with DoD.

Regarding the use of Chinese telecommunications equipment or services, a plurality of respondents (43.2%) indicated that they thought such restrictions on U.S. government contractors would make it harder for American companies to work with DoD (23.4%) or to compete globally (19.8%). A minority of experts (28.8%) believed that such restrictions might not impact U.S. companies’ work with DoD (13.5%) or actually make it easier to do so (15.3%).

As it relates to CMMC, similarly, 50.5% of respondents indicated that they believed these regulations would make it harder for American commercial companies to work with DoD; only 8.1% indicated that they believe the regulations will make it easier for American commercial companies to work with DoD. Perhaps indicating the complexity and challenges associated with CMMC, almost 30% did not offer an opinion.
KEY FINDING 2
The U.S. Military Advantage is Under Pressure from Key Adversaries

The U.S. maintains a comparative military advantage over its adversaries, but 97.3% of respondents believe America’s key adversaries are closing the gap or that the gap has already closed.

"There is a direct correlation between national security, our military and our economy. We have to continue to invest heavily in basic and applied sciences, exploit the research and development of the private sector, and then operationalize that technology."

Maj. Gen. (Ret.) John Wharton
Ret. Commanding General of the Army Research, Development & Engineering Command, U.S. Army

While there were differences in opinion on the extent of U.S. military superiority, nearly every respondent felt that the U.S. military advantage is under pressure from key adversaries.

The majority of respondents (51.4%) agreed that the U.S. retains comparative military advantage in some areas today, but even those experts are concerned that in other key areas America’s adversaries have closed the gap or surpassed America’s long-standing military edge. An additional 45.9% of respondents felt the U.S. continues to maintain a dominant military advantage, but likewise recognized that adversaries are closing the gap. Only 2.7% of NSI and Duco experts surveyed felt the U.S. military advantage would be unchallenged in the future.
KEY FINDING 2
THE U.S. MILITARY ADVANTAGE IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM KEY ADVERSARIES

Consider this statement: "To maintain technological and operational superiority on the battlefield, the DoD must better leverage technologies and capabilities developed by commercial companies, including startups, that do not traditionally supply to DoD. Which of the following best represents your thoughts on that statement?"

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- No opinion
- I don't know enough about this topic

99.1% Strongly or somewhat agree
84.7% Strongly agree
14.4% Somewhat agree
0.9% Somewhat disagree

There was near unanimity amongst NSI and Duco experts - 99.1% - that the U.S. must do a better job of accessing commercial technologies from non-traditional suppliers, including startups, to maintain military superiority.

A majority of respondents (84.7%) strongly agreed and 14.4% somewhat agreed that the Department of Defense should leverage commercial technologies from non-traditional suppliers, including start-ups. Fewer than 1% of respondents disagreed, to some extent, with this notion.

"There is no question that the U.S. military must - and must be allowed to - buy and integrate technology quickly. There are two things standing in the way; the first is the proprietary frameworks used in weapons systems, which means that integrating new technology can be very hard. The second is the Congress, which has enacted laws in response to real and perceived errors in procurement over the years. In order to allow for the fast integration of technology, Congress must allow the military to take risks, some of which will not work out; Congress must resist the temptation to hold hearings and enact laws in reaction to these failures."

Richard Ledgett, Jr.
Fmr. Deputy Director, National Security Agency
"Although the U.S. military advantage is in decline, especially in relation to Chinese military capabilities, it is not too late to reverse the trend...the U.S. must strengthen its R&D prowess and leverage commercial innovation to maintain uncompromising technological dominance on the battlefield."

Brig.-Gen. (Ret.) John Adams
Ret. Brigadier General, U.S. Army; President, Guardian Six Consulting LLC
KEY FINDING 2
THE U.S. MILITARY ADVANTAGE IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM KEY ADVERSARIES

A majority of experts felt the U.S. should limit its dependence on certain key defense-related technologies produced by foreign adversaries.

A significant majority of respondents (92.8%) support provisions in the NDAA requiring the United States to phase out the use of printed circuit boards produced by American adversaries within the next decade, and a majority (57.7%) believed that this issue is important enough that the provisions ought to be modified to shorten this timeframe. Only 2.7% of respondents opposed this provision or thought the timeframe ought to be extended. Likewise, 76.6% of experts supported expanding an existing prohibition on the acquisition of certain metal products from adversaries and tightening restrictions on the acquisitions of such metals, with only a small minority (9%) showing some amount of opposition to such a provision.
KEY FINDING 3
The U.S. Defense Industrial Base is Vulnerable

A clear majority of experts expressed concern that America no longer has the manufacturing capabilities to protect the nation and that the defense industrial base is underfunded.

A clear majority of NSI and Duco experts - 67.6% - agree to some extent that the United States no longer has the necessary manufacturing capabilities to support DoD systems at the rate necessary to protect our national security, though there were variations on the extent of expert concerns.

Of this 67.6%, a plurality (40.5%) somewhat agreed with the notion that the United States lacks the necessary manufacturing and an additional 27% only strongly agreed. A total of 21.6% of respondents disagreed with this concern, with 18.9% somewhat disagreeing and 2.7% strongly disagreeing.

"The majority of large defense procurements take years to award. The cumulative effect of all those lengthy acquisitions is the United States’ industrial base and its corresponding military capabilities losing ground to near-peer competitors."

Nick Tsiopanas
Lead Researcher, Section 809 Panel; Founder & President, ZYGOS Consulting
A clear majority of respondents - 68.5% - agreed that the defense industrial base is underfunded and that this presented a national security risk, but respondents were divided on the extent of the problem.

40.5% of experts strongly agreed that the defense industrial base is underfunded, thereby presenting security risks, while 27.9% somewhat agreed. A significant minority (20.7%) did not believe this was a problem (19.8% somewhat disagreed while 0.9% strongly disagreed).

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{Strongly Agree} & \text{Somewhat Agree} & \text{Somewhat Disagree} & \text{Strongly Disagree} \\
68.5\% & 40.5\% & 19.8\% & 0.9\%
\end{array}
\]

An overwhelming majority of NSI and Duco experts - 88.3% - agreed with the Defense Department’s recent initiative to provide funds to fragile critical manufacturers to help sustain and strengthen essential domestic industrial base capabilities and the defense critical workforce.

The majority of respondents (56.8%) strongly supported this action, while 31.5% somewhat supported it. Only 3.6% had some level of opposition to such support for fragile critical manufacturers.

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c}
\text{Strongly Support} & \text{Somewhat Support} & \text{No Opinion} & \text{Oppose} & \text{I Don’t Know Enough About This Topic} \\
56.8\% & 31.5\% & 1.8\% & 6.3\% & 0.9\%
\end{array}
\]
KEY FINDING 3
THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE IS VULNERABLE

When assessing the process for how the U.S. government procures commercial technologies, there was widespread agreement that the Defense Department’s contracting process is unnecessarily burdensome (82%), and a majority felt that cost and pricing requirements are too bureaucratic.

82% of respondents felt that the defense department’s contracting process was too burdensome, and 57.7% agreed that cost and pricing requirements are too bureaucratic.

"In order to maintain-and ideally expand-the U.S. military's long-standing capability advantage over our adversaries, it is critical that the Department of Defense continue and expand its ongoing efforts to leverage commercial sector innovation and provide for faster and easier acquisition of cutting-edge technology from new and non-traditional providers."

Gen. (Ret.) Keith Alexander
Fmr. Director, National Security Agency; Fmr. Founding Commander, U.S. Cyber Command
DoD must do more to support the defense industrial base, expedite the acquisition process, and protect against China.

“There are significant vulnerabilities in our defense industrial base. We need to invest in our industrial base, particularly focusing on those areas of greatest vulnerability to adversary nations such as China.”

Dr. Jerry McGinn
Fmr. Senior Official in the Office of Manufacturing & Industrial Base Policy, DoD; Executive Director, Center for Government Contracting, George Mason University School of Business

A significant majority of NSI and Duco experts surveyed - 78.4% - believed that it is in the long-term interest of DoD to engage in policy changes that will increase competition and foster a strong defense manufacturing base.

A majority of experts surveyed (59.5%) also took the view that DoD ought to cut regulations and be willing to pay more to achieve these goals. Only 6.3% of respondents believed that DoD ought to maintain current cost-minimizing regulations if they lack the ability to sustain the current defense manufacturing base.

**Which is in the long-term interest of U.S. national security?**

- Implement policy changes to increase competition and foster a strong defense manufacturing base: 78.4%
- Cut regulations and be willing to pay more to increase competition and foster a stronger defense manufacturing base: 59.5%
- Maintain current regulations that seek to minimize costs to the government but may not sustain the current defense manufacturing base: 6.3%
- None of the above: 3.6%
- I don’t know enough about this topic: 2.7%
- No opinion: 0%
Strong majorities of NSI and Duco experts believed that the DoD budget, requirements, and contracting processes are unnecessarily burdensome (76.6% for budget, 69.4% for requirements, and 82% for contracting).

Only 8.1% believe the current DoD budget process adds value (12.6% for the requirements process and 3.6% for contracting) and only 0.9% of respondents think the budget process is just right (4.5% for the requirements process and 2.7% for contracting).

Likewise, significant majorities of experts found the DoD budget, requirements, and contracting processes to be too bureaucratic (72.1% for budget, 67.6% for requirements, and 77.5% for contracting).

Majorities of the experts surveyed also believed that the DoD budget, requirements, and contracting processes have too much oversight or too many layers of review (54.1% for budget, 58.6% for requirements, and 63.1% for contracting). Minorities of those surveyed believed that the budget, requirements, and contracting processes were not sufficiently rigorous (10.8% for budget, 9% for requirements, and 7.2% for contracting) or had insufficient oversight (16.2% for budget, 9.9% for requirements, and 13.5% for contracting). Slightly smaller minorities of those surveyed found the budget, requirements, and contracting processes to be just right on bureaucracy (6.3% on budget, 9% on requirements, and 1.8% on contracting) as well as on oversight or layers of review (11.7% on budget, 11.7% on requirements, and 5.4% on contracting).
Experts also viewed the DoD bid protest process as too bureaucratic, but not as bureaucratic as the contracting, budgeting, or requirements process.  

54.1% of experts considered the bid protest process to be too bureaucratic and 39.6% felt protests added to excessive layers of oversight and review. Bid protests do have some support. A small minority of our experts considered the level of bureaucracy and the amount of oversight to be just right (12.6% and 16.2%, respectively).

“The next Administration needs to get serious about reducing bureaucratic burdens in the acquisition process regarding budget, requirements, and contracting.”

Bryan Smith  
Fmr. Senior Executive, Office of Management & Budget; Fmr. Budget Director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
KEY FINDING 4
MAINTAINING THE U.S. MILITARY’S ADVANTAGE

There was near unanimity - 98.2% - among experts that the U.S. government should support the U.S. national security industrial base to ensure access to critical components. Views on this were quite strongly held, with 86.5% of respondents agreeing that this was a very important issue, while 11.7% felt it was somewhat important and fewer than 1% of respondents indicated that the issue wasn’t very important.

There was overwhelming support among respondents for the government to undertake significant initiatives to strengthen the defense industrial base, and a variety of different approaches received significant support from experts.

**How can the U.S. government support the U.S. national security industrial base?**

- By supporting core research and development in U.S. companies and academia through grant programs. 87.4%
- By providing contracts to U.S. companies for national security goods and services. 80.2%
- By incentivizing investments in U.S. companies that are working on dual use technologies. 78.4%
- By directly investing in U.S. companies that are working on dual use technologies. 60.4%
- I don’t know enough about this topic. 1.8%
- No opinion 1.8%
"A fact of contemporary life is that the U.S. is in a state of constant warfare, primarily in the digital information domain. Our budgeting, contracting and acquisition processes are woefully unprepared to confront the constantly evolving conflict we face. A new paradigm for profound and intimate public-private partnerships, particularly with the commercial sector, is an imperative we must grasp to achieve advantage in this revolutionary digital battlespace."

Charles Alsup
Fmr. Associate Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, and Requirements (ADDNI/PPR), Office of the Director of National Intelligence

A strong majority of experts - 91.9% - agreed with Congress' decisions to delegate acquisition authorities to military services, SOCOM, and Cyber Command.

Only 1.8% of respondents opposed these efforts. In addition, significant majorities also supported new acquisition authorities with 81.1% of respondents supporting new acquisition authorities for the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center and 70.3% supporting DoD’s request to grant independent acquisition authority to the newly-created U.S. Space Force. While only 6.3% of respondents somewhat opposed the new JAIC authorities, it is worth noting that a significant minority of respondents (19.8%) had some level of opposition to the new Space Force authorities (with 8.1% being strongly opposed).
A majority of respondents favored strengthening existing “Buy American” requirements as proposed in the House-passed NDAA.

71.2% of experts supported the House-passed provision requiring every component in major defense programs to be American-made by 2026, with 35.2% strongly holding this view, and 36% somewhat supporting this provision. At the same time, a significant minority (21.6%) indicated some measure of opposition to such a provision (16.2% being somewhat opposed and 5.4% being strongly opposed).

Likewise, a majority of respondents - 63.1% - supported a Senate-passed NDAA provision that would lower the dollar threshold required for DoD to buy domestic parts (from $250,000 to $150,000).

The breakdown of support for this provision was somewhat weaker than for the House "Buy American" provision, with 20.7% of experts strongly supporting the Senate-passed provision, and 42.3% somewhat supporting it. At the same time, overall opposition to the Senate-passed provision was also lower with 18% opposed (12.6% somewhat opposed and 5.4% strongly opposed).
Conclusion

The National Defense Authorization Act plays a critical role in promoting national defense and crafting defense policy. The NDAA authorizes funding for DoD (and defense-related activities at other federal agencies), establishes defense policies and restrictions, and addresses organizational issues within the Department. The FY 2021 NDAA is expected to weigh in on a number of important issues, including restoring military readiness, implementing policies addressing the threats posed by Russia, China, and other adversaries, and reforming the defense acquisition process.

As the House and Senate conference the bill to resolve their differences, our top national security experts are contributing to the debate, providing insight into the complex challenges facing DoD, offering their take on the House and Senate version of the NDAA, and offering advice on how to best promote national security.

As the world we live in continues to evolve and the U.S.’s long-held position as the world’s sole superpower is increasingly challenged, Duco and NSI experts have a two-fold message: protect against external competitors and foster internal collaboration and innovation. Duco and NSI experts believe that China will pose a unique economic and national security threat for the foreseeable future. A significant majority of experts support focusing efforts on defending against China. Almost unanimously, experts support NDAA provisions that would require DoD to protect defense-sensitive technology and data from China and provisions that would prohibit the federal government from contracting with entities that use Chinese telecommunications equipment or services at a significant scale.

Our experts broadly believe that addressing a vulnerable U.S. defense industrial base should be a top priority for DoD. Experts generally supported reforming the defense acquisition process to facilitate government access to non-traditional suppliers, cutting back on regulation, and increasing how much the government pays with the goal of increasing competition and fostering innovation.

Our experts recommend that DoD take meaningful steps to protect its defense-sensitive technology and data from competitors, primarily China, and simultaneously, focus internally on growing a better partnership with its industrial base through an expedited acquisition process to ensure DoD future access to the latest and most innovative technology - access that has been the foundation of U.S. military superiority for more than 80 years.
The Experts
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. (Ret.) John Adams</td>
<td>President, Guardian Six Consulting LLC</td>
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<td>Mike Barrett</td>
<td>Fmr. Director of Strategy, White House Homeland Security Council; Fmr. Intelligence Officer, Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>Dr. Christopher Bright</td>
<td>Fmr. Oversight Subcommittee Staff Leader, House Committee on Armed Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen. (Ret.) Keith Alexander</td>
<td>Fmr. Director, National Security Agency; Fmr. Founding Commander, U.S. Cyber Command</td>
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<td>Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies &amp; Senior Fellow of the Merrill Center, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies</td>
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<td>Fmr. Counsel to the Attorney General, DoJ; Partner, Wiley Rein LLP</td>
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<td>The Experts</td>
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| **Shawnee Delaney**  
Fmr. Intelligence Officer, CIA |
| **Matthew Ferraro**  
Fmr. Intelligence Officer, CIA; Senior Associate, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr |
| **David Coher**  
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| **Joe Costa**  
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| **David Drabkin, Esq.**  
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30
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<td>Fmr. ICT Sector Lead, Governor Jay Inslee; Seattle Director, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory</td>
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Survey Questions
1. In which of the following areas do you have strong expertise?
   A. Aerospace/Aviation
   B. Contracting/Acquisition Policy
   C. Cybersecurity
   D. Defense Procurement
   E. Economics
   F. Emerging Technology
   G. Entrepreneurship
   H. Finance
   I. Foreign Policy/Geopolitics
   J. Homeland Security
   K. Intellectual Property
   L. Intelligence
   M. Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
   N. National security
   O. Private Sector Business Practices
   P. Private Equity
   Q. Startups
   R. Telecommunications
   S. Venture Capital

2. If you have regional expertise, please select accordingly.
   A. Africa (sub-Sahara) Region
   B. East Asia and Pacific Region
   C. Europe and Eurasia Region
   D. Near East (North African and Middle East) Region
   E. South and Central Asia Region
   F. Western Hemisphere Region
   G. International Organizations
   H. Others
3. **If you have country expertise, please select accordingly.**
   A. Israel
   B. Iran
   C. India
   D. North Korea
   E. Pakistan
   F. China
   G. Russia
   H. NATO Countries
   I. Others

4. **The U.S. is operating in a geopolitical and strategic environment where...**
   A. it enjoys a dominant military advantage that will likely be unchallenged in the future.
   B. it enjoys a dominant military advantage but potential adversaries are closing the gap.
   C. the U.S. enjoys a comparative military advantage in some areas, but in others the gap has closed or the US has been surpassed.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

5. **China is a major...**
   A. economic competitor to the U.S.
   B. national security competitor to the U.S.
   C. economic ally to the U.S.
   D. national security ally to the U.S.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

6. **China is currently a...**
   A. regional actor and likely to remain so in the next decade.
   B. regional actor and likely to become a global actor in the next decade.
   C. global actor and likely to remain so in the next decade.
   D. global actor and likely to become a regional actor in the next decade.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.
7. **Russia is a major...**
   A. economic competitor to the U.S.
   B. national security competitor to the U.S.
   C. economic ally to the U.S.
   D. national security ally to the U.S.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

8. **Russia is currently a...**
   A. regional actor and likely to remain so in the next decade.
   B. regional actor and likely to become a global actor in the next decade.
   C. global actor and likely to remain so in the next decade.
   D. global actor and likely to become a regional actor in the next decade.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

9. **Iran is a major...**
   A. economic competitor to the U.S.
   B. national security competitor to the U.S.
   C. economic ally to the U.S.
   D. national security ally to the U.S.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

10. **Iran is currently a...**
    A. regional actor and likely to remain so in the next decade.
    B. regional actor and likely to become a global actor in the next decade.
    C. global actor and likely to remain so in the next decade.
    D. global actor and likely to become a regional actor in the next decade.
    E. No opinion
    F. I don't know enough about this topic.
11. **North Korea is a major...**
   A. economic competitor to the U.S.
   B. national security competitor to the U.S.
   C. economic ally to the U.S.
   D. national security ally to the U.S.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

12. **North Korea is currently a...**
   A. regional actor and likely to remain so in the next decade.
   B. regional actor and likely to become a global actor in the next decade.
   C. global actor and likely to remain so in the next decade.
   D. global actor and likely to become a regional actor in the next decade.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

13. **Consider this statement: "To maintain technological and operational superiority on the battlefield, the DoD must better leverage technologies and capabilities developed by commercial companies, including startups, that do not traditionally supply to DoD."**
   Which of the following best represents your thoughts on that statement?
   A. Strongly agree
   B. Somewhat agree
   C. Somewhat disagree
   D. Strongly disagree
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

14. **How important is it for the U.S. government to support the U.S. national security industrial base to ensure access to critical components?**
   A. Very important
   B. Somewhat important
   C. Not very important
   D. Not at all important
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

15. **How can the U.S. government best support the U.S. national security industrial base?**
SURVEY QUESTIONS (CONT.)

A. By providing contracts to U.S. companies for national security goods and services
B. By supporting core research and development in U.S. companies and academia through grant programs
C. By directly investing in U.S. companies that are working on dual use technologies
D. By incentivizing investments in U.S. companies that are working on dual use technologies
E. I don’t know enough about this topic.
F. No opinion
G. Other (tool allows respondents to answer when choosing Other)

16. The Senate and House NDAA bills contain a provision phasing out U.S. purchases of printed circuit boards produced in China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other designated countries over the next 10 years. You...
   A. strongly support this provision.
   B. somewhat support this provision.
   C. somewhat oppose this provision.
   D. strongly oppose this provision.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don’t know enough about this topic.

17. With respect to the NDAA provision phasing out U.S. purchases of printed circuit boards produced in China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other designated countries over the next 10 years. You would...
   A. shorten the timeframe to less than 10 years
   B. lengthen the timeframe to more than 10 years
   C. keep the current timeframe of 10 years
   D. No opinion
   E. I don’t know enough about this topic.

18. The Senate NDAA would require DoD protect defense-sensitive technology and data from being acquired by China. You...
   A. strongly support this provision.
   B. somewhat support this provision.
   C. somewhat oppose this provision.
   D. strongly oppose this provision.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don’t know enough about this topic.
19. The House NDAA would expand an existing prohibition on acquiring certain metal products from Russia, North Korea, China, or Iran, to include tungsten and would also tighten existing restrictions on the acquisition of such metals. You...
   A. strongly support this provision.
   B. somewhat support this provision.
   C. somewhat oppose this provision.
   D. strongly oppose this provision.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

20. The House NDAA would tighten "Buy America" requirements for major defense program components by 75% of the content to be domestic by Oct. 2021 and 100% by Oct. 2026. You...
   A. strongly support this provision.
   B. somewhat support this provision.
   C. somewhat oppose this provision.
   D. strongly oppose this provision.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

21. Today, there is a requirement to buy certain domestic items on any program that is more than $250,000. The Senate NDAA bill would lower that dollar threshold to $150,000, accounting for inflation adjustments made every 5 years. You...
   A. strongly support this provision.
   B. somewhat support this provision.
   C. somewhat oppose this provision.
   D. strongly oppose this provision.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.
22. Through a specific authority, the Senate NDAA bill would permanently allow DoD to acquire innovative commercial products and services through general solicitations if there is a competitive peer review of proposals. You...
   A. strongly support this provision.
   B. somewhat support this provision.
   C. somewhat oppose this provision.
   D. strongly oppose this provision.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

23. The House NDAA bill would require the National Defense Strategy to put more of a priority on sustainment of major defense acquisition programs. You...
   A. strongly support this provision.
   B. somewhat support this provision.
   C. somewhat oppose this provision.
   D. strongly oppose this provision.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

24. The House NDAA bill requires the DoD to develop metrics for readiness and availability of weapons systems, and to submit sustainment plans and cost estimates prior to production. You...
   A. strongly support this provision.
   B. somewhat support this provision.
   C. somewhat oppose this provision.
   D. strongly oppose this provision.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

25. The U.S. no longer possesses the necessary manufacturing capabilities to support DoD systems at the rate required to protect our national security. You...
   A. strongly agree.
   B. somewhat agree.
   C. somewhat disagree.
   D. strongly disagree.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.
26. The defense industrial base supply chain is underfunded, which presents a national security risk. You...
   A. strongly agree.
   B. somewhat agree.
   C. somewhat disagree.
   D. strongly disagree.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don’t know enough about this topic.

27. Which is in the long-term interest of U.S. national security?
   A. Maintain current regulations that seek to minimize costs to the government but may not sustain the current defense manufacturing base.
   B. Cut regulations and be willing to pay more to increase competition and foster a stronger defense manufacturing base.
   C. Engage in other policy changes to increase competition and foster a strong defense manufacturing base.
   D. None of the above
   E. No opinion
   F. I don’t know enough about this topic

28. The FY 2019 NDAA (section 889) generally prohibits the federal government from contracting entities that use certain Chinese telecommunications equipment or services at a significant scale. You believe that enforcement of this requirement is generally...
   A. very important.
   B. somewhat important.
   C. not important.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don’t know enough about this topic.
29. With respect to the Chinese telecommunications equipment or services provision from the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA, the U.S. government has previously delayed implementation to give government contractors more time to comply. You would...
   A. continue to extend the time available to comply for over a year.
   B. continue to extend the time available to comply for only one year.
   C. continue to extend the time available to comply for less than a year.
   D. enforce the restriction now.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

30. How does the Chinese telecommunications equipment or services provision from the FY2019 NDAA impact DoD’s efforts to attract new companies to work with DoD?
   A. It makes it easier for American commercial companies to work with DoD.
   B. It makes it harder for American commercial companies to work with DoD.
   C. It limits the ability of American companies who comply to compete globally.
   D. It does not impact American commercial companies working with DoD.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

31. DoD is incorporating the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) as a requirement for defense contracting. You believe this provision is...
   A. very important.
   B. somewhat important.
   C. not important.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

32. How would the CMMC requirement impact DoD’s efforts to attract new companies to work with DoD?
   A. It makes it easier for American commercial companies to work with DoD.
   B. It makes it harder for American commercial companies to work with DoD.
   C. It does not impact American commercial companies working with DoD.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.
33. In recent years, Congress has delegated more acquisition authority to military services, SOCOM, and Cyber Command. You...
   A. support all of these efforts.
   B. support most of these efforts.
   C. oppose most of these efforts.
   D. oppose all of these efforts.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

34. Do you support the Defense Department’s request to grant the newly-established U.S. Space Force independent acquisition authorities?
   A. Strongly support
   B. Somewhat support
   C. Somewhat oppose
   D. Strongly oppose
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

35. Do you support the House NDAA provision which would give the Director of Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) acquisition authorities that are equivalent to the head of an agency?
   A. Strongly support
   B. Somewhat support
   C. Somewhat oppose
   D. Strongly oppose
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.

36. DoD recently announced that it would provide funds to fragile critical manufacturers to help sustain and strengthen essential domestic industrial base capabilities and defense critical workforce. You...
   A. strongly support such actions.
   B. somewhat support such actions.
   C. somewhat oppose such actions.
   D. strongly oppose such actions.
   E. No opinion
   F. I don't know enough about this topic.
37. Should DoD maintain a cadre of experts to help contracting officers in navigating commercial item determinations, intellectual property issues and a range of contracting approaches?
   A. Yes
   B. No
   C. Not sure
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

For the following questions, please provide your opinion on if each component of the government acquisition process...
1) adds value.
2) is unnecessarily burdensome.
3) is just right.
4) No opinion
5) I don't know enough about this topic.

38. The current DoD budget process...
   A. adds value.
   B. is unnecessarily burdensome.
   C. is just right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

39. The DoD requirements process...
   A. adds value.
   B. is unnecessarily burdensome.
   C. is just right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

40. The DoD contracting process...
   A. adds value.
   B. is unnecessarily burdensome.
   C. is just right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.
41. DoD small business set-asides...
   A. add value.
   B. are unnecessarily burdensome.
   C. are just right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

42. Other DoD set-asides...
   A. add value.
   B. are unnecessarily burdensome.
   C. are just right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

For the following questions, please provide your opinion on if each component of the
government acquisition process...

1) is too bureaucratic/slow the process down too much.
2) is not sufficiently rigorous.
3) is about right.
4) No opinion
5) I don't know enough about this topic.

43. The DoD budget process...
   A. is too bureaucratic.
   B. is not sufficiently rigorous.
   C. is about right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

44. The DoD requirements process...
   A. is too bureaucratic.
   B. is not sufficiently rigorous.
   C. is about right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.
SURVEY QUESTIONS (CONT.)

45. The DoD contracting process...
   A. is too bureaucratic.
   B. is not sufficiently rigorous.
   C. is about right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

46. DoD commercial items regulations...
   A. are too bureaucratic.
   B. are not sufficiently rigorous.
   C. are about right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

47. DoD cost and pricing requirements...
   A. are too bureaucratic.
   B. are not sufficiently rigorous.
   C. are about right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

48. DoD bid protests...
   A. are too bureaucratic.
   B. are not sufficiently rigorous.
   C. are about right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

49. DoD small business set-asides...
   A. are too bureaucratic.
   B. are not sufficiently rigorous.
   C. are about right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.
50. **Other DoD set-asides...**
   A. are too bureaucratic.
   B. are not sufficiently rigorous.
   C. are about right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don’t know enough about this topic.

**For the following questions, please provide your opinion on if each component of the government acquisition process...**

1) has too much oversight/layers of review.
2) has insufficient oversight.
3) is just right.
4) No opinion
5) I don’t know enough about this topic.

51. **The DoD budget process...**
   A. has too much oversight/layers of review.
   B. has insufficient oversight.
   C. is just right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don’t know enough about this topic.

52. **The DoD requirements process...**
   A. has too much oversight/layers of review.
   B. has insufficient oversight.
   C. is just right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don’t know enough about this topic.

53. **The DoD contracting process...**
   A. has too much oversight/layers of review.
   B. has insufficient oversight.
   C. is just right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don’t know enough about this topic.
SURVEY QUESTIONS (CONT.)

54. **The DoD bid protests...**
   A. have too much oversight/layers of review.
   B. have insufficient oversight.
   C. are just right.
   D. No opinion
   E. I don't know enough about this topic.

55. **Are you interested in being more active on any of these topics? If so, what is of particular interest to you?**
   **Duco will be in touch after the survey with future opportunities.**
   **Multiple selection allowed.**
   A. Speaking on panels or at events
   B. Writing policy papers
   C. Writing op-eds
   D. Contributing to surveys like this
   E. Advising companies
   F. Educating policy-makers
   G. None of the above
   H. Other (fill in)
Aggregated Data
1. The U.S. is operating in a geopolitical and strategic environment where...

The U.S. enjoys a comparative military advantage in some areas, but in others the gap has closed or the US has been surpassed.

- It enjoys a dominant military advantage that will likely be unchallenged in the future: 45.9% (57 resp.)
- It enjoys a dominant military advantage that will likely be unchallenged in the future: 2.7% (3 resp.)
- I don't know enough about this topic: 0% (0 resp.)
- No opinion: 0% (0 resp.)

2. China is a major...

- National security competitor to the U.S.: 96.4% (107 resp.)
- Economic competitor to the U.S.: 88.3% (98 resp.)
- Economic ally to the U.S.: 7.2% (8 resp.)
- No opinion: 0.9% (1 resp.)
- National security ally to the U.S.: 0.9% (1 resp.)
- I don’t know enough about this topic: 0% (0 resp.)
China is currently a...  

3  China is currently a global actor and likely to remain so in the next decade.  

73%  81 resp.  

21.6%  24 resp.  

2.7%  3 resp.  

1.8%  2 resp.  

No opinion  

0.9%  1 resp.  

I don't know enough about this topic.  

0%  

Russia is a major...  

4  Russia is a major national security competitor to the U.S.  

99.1%  110 resp.  

12.6%  14 resp.  

0.9%  1 resp.  

I don't know enough about this topic.  

0.9%  1 resp.  

national security ally to the U.S.  

0.9%  1 resp.  

No opinion  

0%
5 Russia is currently a…

- global actor and likely to remain so in the next decade: 53.2% (59 resp.)
- regional actor and likely to remain so in the next decade: 26.1% (29 resp.)
- global actor and likely to become a regional actor in the next decade: 10.8% (12 resp.)
- global actor and likely to become a regional actor in the next decade: 7.2% (12 resp.)
- regional actor and likely to become a global actor in the next decade: 1.8% (8 resp.)

I don’t know enough about this topic: 0.9% (2 resp.)

6 Iran is a major…

- national security competitor to the U.S.: 87.4% (97 resp.)
- No opinion: 11.7% (13 resp.)
- economic competitor to the U.S.: 5.4% (6 resp.)
- I don’t know enough about this topic: 0.9% (1 resp.)
- economic ally to the U.S.: 0% (0 resp.)
- national security ally to the U.S.: 0% (0 resp.)
7 Iran is currently a…
   regional actor and likely to remain so in the next decade.
     81.1% 90 resp.
   regional actor and likely to become a global actor in the next decade.
     9% 10 resp.
   global actor and likely to remain so in the next decade.
     5.4% 6 resp.
   I don’t know enough about this topic.
     1.8% 2 resp.
   No opinion
     1.8% 2 resp.
   global actor and likely to become a regional actor in the next decade.
     0.9% 1 resp.

8 North Korea is a major…
   national security competitor to the U.S.
     90.1% 100 resp.
   No opinion
     9% 10 resp.
   economic competitor to the U.S.
     1.8% 2 resp.
   I don’t know enough about this topic.
     0.9% 1 resp.
   economic ally to the U.S.
     0% 0 resp.
   national security ally to the U.S.
     0% 0 resp.
Consider this statement: “To maintain technological and operational superiority on the battlefield, the DoD must better leverage technologies and capabilities developed by commercial companies, including startups, that do not traditionally supply to DoD.” Which of the following best represents your thoughts on that statement?

**Strongly agree**

84.7% 94 resp.

**Somewhat agree**

14.4% 16 resp.

**Somewhat disagree**

0.9% 1 resp.

I don't know enough about this topic.

0% 0 resp.

**No opinion**

0% 0 resp.

**Strongly disagree**

0% 0 resp.
11 How important is it for the U.S. government to support the U.S. national security industrial base to ensure access to critical components?

Very important: 86.5% (96 resp.)
Somewhat important: 11.7% (13 resp.)
No opinion: 0.9% (1 resp.)
Not very important: 0.9% (1 resp.)
I don't know enough about this topic: 0% (0 resp.)
Not at all important: 0% (0 resp.)

12 How can the U.S. government best support the U.S. national security industrial base?

By supporting core research and development in U.S. companies and academia through grant programs: 87.4% (97 resp.)
By providing contracts to U.S. companies for national security goods and services: 80.2% (89 resp.)
By incentivizing investments in U.S. companies that are working on dual use technologies: 78.4% (87 resp.)
By directly investing in U.S. companies that are working on dual use technologies: 60.4% (67 resp.)
I don't know enough about this topic: 1.8% (2 resp.)
Other: 1.8% (2 resp.)
The Senate and House NDAA bills contain a provision phasing out U.S. purchases of printed circuit boards produced in China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other designated countries over the next 10 years. You…

strongly support this provision. 65.8% 73 resp.

somewhat support this provision. 27% 30 resp.

I don’t know enough about this topic. 3.6% 4 resp.

somewhat oppose this provision. 2.7% 3 resp.

No opinion 0.9% 1 resp.

strongly oppose this provision. 0% 0 resp.

With respect to the NDAA provision phasing out U.S. purchases of printed circuit boards produced in China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other designated countries over the next 10 years. You would…

shorten the timeframe to less than 10 years. 57.7% 64 resp.

keep the current timeframe of 10 years. 27% 30 resp.

I don’t know enough about this topic. 9% 10 resp.

No opinion 3.6% 4 resp.

lengthen the timeframe to more than 10 years. 2.7% 3 resp.
The Senate NDAA would require DoD protect defense-sensitive technology and data from being acquired by China. You...

- **Strongly support this provision.**
  - 88.3% (98 responses)

- **Somewhat support this provision.**
  - 9% (10 responses)

- **I don't know enough about this topic.**
  - 2.7% (3 responses)

- **No opinion**
  - 0% (0 responses)

- **Somewhat oppose this provision.**
  - 0% (0 responses)

- **Strongly oppose this provision.**
  - 0% (0 responses)

The House NDAA would expand an existing prohibition on acquiring certain metal products from Russia, North Korea, China, or Iran, to include tungsten and would also tighten existing restrictions on the acquisition of such metals. You...

- **Strongly support this provision.**
  - 47.7% (53 responses)

- **Somewhat support this provision.**
  - 28.8% (32 responses)

- **I don't know enough about this topic.**
  - 10.8% (12 responses)

- **Somewhat oppose this provision.**
  - 8.1% (9 responses)

- **No opinion**
  - 3.6% (4 responses)

- **Strongly oppose this provision.**
  - 0.9% (1 response)
The House NDAA would tighten “Buy America” requirements for major defense program components by 75% of the content to be domestic by Oct. 2021 and 100% by Oct. 2026. You...

17

somewhat support this provision.

strongly support this provision.

somewhat oppose this provision.

I don’t know enough about this topic.

strongly oppose this provision.

No opinion

Today, there is a requirement to buy certain domestic items on any program that is more than $250,000. The Senate NDAA bill would lower that dollar threshold to $150,000, accounting for inflation adjustments made every 5 years. You...

18

somewhat support this provision.

strongly support this provision.

I don’t know enough about this topic.

somewhat oppose this provision.

No opinion

strongly oppose this provision.
**Through a specific authority, the Senate NDAA bill would permanently allow DoD to acquire innovative commercial products and services through general solicitations if there is a competitive peer review of proposals. You...**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly support this provision</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>60 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat support this provision</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>41 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know enough about this topic</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>6 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat oppose this provision</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly oppose this provision</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 resp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The House NDAA bill would require the National Defense Strategy to put more of a priority on sustainment of major defense acquisition programs. You...**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
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<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly support this provision</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>51 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat support this provision</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>36 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know enough about this topic</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>13 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat oppose this provision</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>7 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>4 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly oppose this provision</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 resp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The House NDAA bill requires the DoD to develop metrics for readiness and availability of weapons systems, and to submit sustainment plans and cost estimates prior to production. You...

- **Strongly support this provision.** 54.1% (60 resp.)
- **Somewhat support this provision.** 29.7% (33 resp.)
- **I don't know enough about this topic.** 8.1% (9 resp.)
- **Somewhat oppose this provision.** 5.4% (6 resp.)
- **No opinion.** 2.7% (3 resp.)
- **Strongly oppose this provision.** 0% (0 resp.)

The U.S. no longer possesses the necessary manufacturing capabilities to support DoD systems at the rate required to protect our national security. You...

- **Somewhat agree.** 40.5% (45 resp.)
- **Strongly agree.** 27% (30 resp.)
- **Somewhat disagree.** 18.9% (21 resp.)
- **I don't know enough about this topic.** 9% (10 resp.)
- **Strongly disagree.** 2.7% (3 resp.)
- **No opinion.** 1.8% (1 resp.)
The defense industrial base supply chain is underfunded, which presents a national security risk. You…

- **Strongly Agree**: 40.5% (45 resp.)
- **Somewhat Agree**: 27.9% (31 resp.)
- **Somewhat Disagree**: 19.8% (22 resp.)
- **I Don’t Know Enough About This Topic**: 9.9% (11 resp.)
- **No Opinion**: 0.9% (1 resp.)
- **Strongly Disagree**: 0.9% (1 resp.)

Which is in the long-term interest of U.S. national security?

- **Engage in other policy changes to increase competition and foster a strong defense manufacturing base**: 78.4% (87 resp.)
- **Cut regulations and be willing to pay more to increase competition and foster a stronger defense manufacturing base**: 59.5% (66 resp.)
- **Maintain current regulations that seek to minimize costs to the government but may not sustain the current defense manufacturing base**: 6.3% (7 resp.)
- **No Opinion**: 3.6% (7 resp.)
- **I Don’t Know Enough About This Topic**: 2.7% (3 resp.)
- **None of the Above**: 0% (0 resp.)
The FY 2019 NDAA (section 889) generally prohibits the federal government from contracting entities that use certain Chinese telecommunications equipment or services at a significant scale. You believe that enforcement of this requirement is generally...

very important. 85.6% 95 resp.

somewhat important. 11.7% 13 resp.

not important. 1.8% 2 resp.

I don't know enough about this topic. 0.9% 1 resp.

No opinion 0% 0 resp.

With respect to the Chinese telecommunications equipment or services provision from the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA, the U.S. government has previously delayed implementation to give government contractors more time to comply. You would...

continue to extend the time available to comply for only one year. 32.4% 36 resp.

enforce the restriction now. 26.1% 29 resp.

continue to extend the time available to comply for over a year. 16.2% 18 resp.

continue to extend the time available to comply for less than a year. 14.4% 16 resp.

I don't know enough about this topic. 5.4% 6 resp.

No opinion 5.4% 6 resp.
27 How does the Chinese telecommunications equipment or services provision from the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA impact DoD’s efforts to attract new companies to work with DoD?

- It makes it harder for American commercial companies to work with DoD: 23.4% (26 resp.)
- It limits the ability of American companies who comply to compete globally: 19.8% (22 resp.)
- I don’t know enough about this topic: 15.3% (17 resp.)
- It makes it easier for American commercial companies to work with DoD: 15.3% (17 resp.)
- It does not impact American commercial companies working with DoD: 13.5% (15 resp.)
- No opinion: 12.6% (14 resp.)

28 DoD is incorporating the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) as a requirement for defense contracting. You believe this provision is...

- Very important: 41.4% (46 resp.)
- Somewhat important: 27% (30 resp.)
- I don’t know enough about this topic: 25.2% (28 resp.)
- Not important: 4.5% (5 resp.)
- No opinion: 1.8% (2 resp.)
How would the CMMC requirement impact DoD’s efforts to attract new companies to work with DoD?

- It makes it harder for American commercial companies to work with DoD.
  - 50.5% (56 resp.)
- I don’t know enough about this topic.
  - 25.2% (28 resp.)
- It makes it easier for American commercial companies to work with DoD.
  - 8.1% (9 resp.)
- It does not impact American commercial companies working with DoD.
  - 7.2% (8 resp.)
- It limits the ability of American companies who comply to compete globally.
  - 4.5% (5 resp.)
- No opinion
  - 4.5% (5 resp.)

In recent years, Congress has delegated more acquisition authority to military services, SOCOM, and Cyber Command. You...

- support all of these efforts.
  - 47.7% (53 resp.)
- support most of these efforts.
  - 44.1% (49 resp.)
- I don’t know enough about this topic.
  - 3.6% (4 resp.)
- No opinion
  - 2.7% (3 resp.)
- oppose most of these efforts.
  - 1.8% (2 resp.)
- oppose all of these efforts.
  - 0% (0 resp.)
31 Do you support the Defense Department’s request to grant the newly-established U.S. Space Force independent acquisition authorities?

- Somewhat support: 38.7% (43 resp.)
- Strongly support: 31.5% (35 resp.)
- Somewhat oppose: 11.7% (11 resp.)
- Strongly oppose: 8.1% (8 resp.)
- I don't know enough about this topic: 7.2% (8 resp.)
- No opinion: 2.7% (3 resp.)

32 Do you support the House NDAA provision which would give the Director of Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) acquisition authorities that are equivalent to the head of an agency?

- Somewhat support: 41.4% (46 resp.)
- Strongly support: 39.6% (44 resp.)
- I don't know enough about this topic: 9.9% (11 resp.)
- Somewhat oppose: 6.3% (7 resp.)
- No opinion: 2.7% (3 resp.)
- Strongly oppose: 0% (0 resp.)
DoD recently announced that it would provide funds to fragile critical manufacturers to help sustain and strengthen essential domestic industrial base capabilities and defense critical workforce. You...

should DoD maintain a cadre of experts to help contracting officers in navigating commercial item determinations, intellectual property issues and a range of contracting approaches?

Yes 80.1% 89 resp.

Not sure 8.1% 10 resp.

I don't know enough about this topic. 6.3% 7 resp.

No 3.6% 4 resp.

No opinion 0.9% 1 resp.
### AGGREGATED DATA CONT.

#### 35 The current DoD budget process...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
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<td>is unnecessarily burdensome</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
<td>85 resp.</td>
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<td>adds value</td>
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<td>9 resp.</td>
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<td>7.2%</td>
<td>8 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>8 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is just right</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1 resp.</td>
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</table>

#### 36 The DoD requirements process...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
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<td>is unnecessarily burdensome</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
<td>77 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adds value</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>14 resp.</td>
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<td>I don't know enough about this topic</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>7 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>8 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is just right</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>5 resp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The DoD contracting process...

is unnecessarily burdensome.

82% 91 resp.

I don't know enough about this topic.

6.3% 7 resp.

No opinion

5.4% 6 resp.

adds value.

3.6% 4 resp.

is just right.

2.7% 3 resp.

DoD small business set-asides...

add value.

43.2% 48 resp.

are unnecessarily burdensome.

27.9% 31 resp.

I don't know enough about this topic.

16.2% 18 resp.

No opinion

7.2% 8 resp.

are just right.

5.4% 6 resp.
### Other DoD set-asides…

- **Add value.** 28.8% (32 resp.)
- **Are unnecessarily burdensome.** 26.1% (29 resp.)
- **I don't know enough about this topic.** 22.5% (25 resp.)
- **No opinion.** 19.8% (22 resp.)
- **Is just right.** 2.7% (3 resp.)

### The DoD budget process…

- **Is too bureaucratic.** 72.1% (80 resp.)
- **Is not sufficiently rigorous.** 10.8% (12 resp.)
- **I don't know enough about this topic.** 6.3% (7 resp.)
- **Is about right.** 6.3% (7 resp.)
- **No opinion.** 4.5% (5 resp.)
The DoD requirements process...

- too bureaucratic: 67.6% (75 resp.)
- about right: 9% (10 resp.)
- not sufficiently rigorous: 9% (10 resp.)
- I don't know enough about this topic: 7.2% (8 resp.)
- No opinion: 7.2% (8 resp.)

The DoD contracting process...

- too bureaucratic: 77.5% (86 resp.)
- I don't know enough about this topic: 9.9% (11 resp.)
- not sufficiently rigorous: 7.2% (8 resp.)
- No opinion: 3.6% (4 resp.)
- about right: 1.8% (2 resp.)
DoD commercial items regulations...

- too bureaucratic: 45.9% (51 responses)
- not enough about this topic: 20.7% (23 responses)
- about right: 14.4% (16 responses)
- not sufficiently rigorous: 11.7% (13 responses)
- no opinion: 7.2% (8 responses)

DoD cost and pricing requirements...

- too bureaucratic: 57.7% (64 responses)
- not enough about this topic: 15.3% (17 responses)
- not sufficiently rigorous: 13.5% (15 responses)
- about right: 7.2% (8 responses)
- no opinion: 6.3% (7 responses)
AGGREGATED DATA CONT.

45 DoD bid protests...

- are too bureaucratic: 54.1% (60 resp.)
- I don't know enough about this topic: 18.9% (21 resp.)
- are about right: 12.6% (12 resp.)
- are not sufficiently rigorous: 9.9% (11 resp.)
- No opinion: 4.5% (5 resp.)

46 DoD small business set-asides...

- are about right: 3.5% (35 resp.)
- are too bureaucratic: 3.2% (32 resp.)
- I don't know enough about this topic: 2.2% (22 resp.)
- No opinion: 1.3% (13 resp.)
- are not sufficiently rigorous: 0.9% (9 resp.)
### 47 Other DoD set-asides…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>are too bureaucratic.</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>32 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know enough about this topic.</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>27 resp.</td>
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<tr>
<td>are about right.</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>24 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
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<td>24 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are not sufficiently rigorous.</td>
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<td>4 resp.</td>
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### 48 The DoD budget process…

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<td>18 resp.</td>
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<tr>
<td>is just right.</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>13 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>11 resp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know enough about this topic.</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>9 resp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AGGREGATED DATA CONT.

49 The DoD requirements process...

- **has too much oversight/layers of review.**
  - 58.6% (65 resp.)

- **is just right.**
  - 11.7% (13 resp.)

- **I don't know enough about this topic.**
  - 10.8% (12 resp.)

- **has insufficient oversight.**
  - 9.9% (11 resp.)

- **No opinion**
  - 9% (10 resp.)

50 The DoD contracting process...

- **has too much oversight/layers of review.**
  - 63.1% (70 resp.)

- **has insufficient oversight.**
  - 13.5% (15 resp.)

- **I don't know enough about this topic.**
  - 11.7% (13 resp.)

- **No opinion**
  - 6.3% (7 resp.)

- **is just right.**
  - 5.4% (6 resp.)
The DoD bid protests…

- have too much oversight/layers of review: 39.6% (44 resp.)
- I don't know enough about this topic: 21.6% (24 resp.)
- are just right: 16.2% (18 resp.)
- No opinion: 13.5% (15 resp.)
- have insufficient oversight: 9% (10 resp.)